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beliefs-are best given whatever evidence is deemed relevant). 
Even if Helm's defense of certain belief-policies is not as satisfying as 
one might hope, we can still learn something from his way of conceptu-
alizing the issues. For example, Helm would have us ask "What can we 
say in support of the higher-order belief that beliefs formed by sense 
perception have some presumption in their favor?" in place of the more 
familiar "Can we give a non-question-begging defense of the reliability 
of sense perception?". It may be that Helm's way of asking these ques-
tions will open new possibilities for those who wish to answer them, or 
perhaps make clearer that certain answers must always be unavailable. 
Belief Policies offers a novel and, in my judgment, useful approach to 
its subject matter. This book provides a new perspective from which to 
view some issues in epistemology that already receive a good deal of 
attention. It also pushes to the surface interesting and important issues 
that do not receive enough attention, such as questions about the role of 
the will in belief formation and parallels between epistemology and 
ethics-parallels that can be eclipsed by other waX's of approaching epis-
temology. This is a fine book well worth reading. 
* Thanks to my colleagues Tony Ellis, Gene Mills, and Peter Vallentyne 
for helpful comments on an early draft of this review. 
The God Who Acts, edited by Thomas F. Tracy. University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. Pp. x and 148. $28.50 (Cloth); 
$14.95 (Paper). 
CHARLES TALIAFERRO, St. Olaf College. 
This is a fine collection of four original papers by philosophers and 
theologians on the theistic concept of Divine agency. Each of the papers 
is followed by a critical response from different authors and the result is 
a book that is genuinely a case of philosophical theology (or, if you like, 
theological philosophy). 
In "Divine Action: Some Moral Considerations" Maurice Wiles articu-
lates an ostensibly deistic version of Christianity. He defends the intelli-
gibility of thinking of God as the creator and sustainer of the cosmos, a 
God who creates but does not author miracles or other specific providen-
tial events. He adopts a free-will defense to preserve the belief in God's 
goodness. According to Wiles, creation involves a severe divine self-limi-
tation and "the concept of divine intervention clearly constitutes a quali-
fication of the nature and extent of that divine self-limitation" (p. 22). 
Supernaturalist versions of theism in which God does intervene in 
human history face a serious ethical problem. If God intervenes to save 
some people and not others, this is unfair. With respect to the Matthaen 
story of the Massacre of the Innocents, Wiles asks: "If God warns 
through dreams, why only Joseph'? Were the other children of 
Bethlehem dispensable?"(p. 21) If specific divine acts that prevent disas-
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ters are part of God's plans, why aren't such saving acts more wide-
spread? Over against the testimony of some Christians to have benefited 
from divine providence, Wiles writes: "In many cases the nature of such 
claimed interventions seems trivial when set in the context of Auschwitz 
and Hiroshima, which no providential action prevented" (p. 22). 
In his reply, R. M. Adams draws attention to the ways in which belief 
in Divine intervention can assist, rather than hinder, the cause of theodi-
cy. An appreciation of theistic portraits of how God interacts with cre-
ation can enhance our conception of the goods that may be realized 
through suffering, and belief in the miracle of an afterlife can broaden 
our view of creation and the prospects of the ultimate triumph of good 
over evil. "By offering a much larger theater for the working out of 
God's purposes for us, the belief in life after death opens the way for 
some accounts of God's purposes in permitting evils-accounts that 
would otherwise be impossible or most implausible" (p. 35). This seems 
to me to be fundamentally correct and, as the belief in an afterlife appears 
to be best cast as belief in Divine miraculous intervention, an effectual 
challenge to Wiles' deistic theology. Perhaps only Joseph is warned on 
one occasion and some children are not saved from a tyrant, but if those 
children who died, indeed if all persons who die, are annihilated at 
death, one has to turn Wiles' question around: Can Wiles secure a belief 
in the goodness of God while believing all created persons are dispens-
able? As for Wiles' allusion to Auschwitz, consider Dan Cohn-Sherbok's 
observation from his insightful paper, "Jewish Faith and the Holocaust." 
Cohn-Sherbock reviews the different moves in Holocaust theology and 
concludes that belief in an afterlife is essential for Judaic theism. 
Yet without this belief [in an afterlife], it is simply impossible to 
make sense of the world as the creation of an all-good and all-
powerful God. Without the eventual vindication of the right-
eous in Paradise, there is no way to sustain the belief in a provi-
dential God who watches over His chosen people. The essence 
of the Jewish understanding of God is that He loves His chosen 
people. If death means extinction, there is no way to make sense 
of the claim that He loves and cherishes all those who died in 
the concentration camps-suffering and death would ultimately 
triumph over each of those who perished. But if there is eternal 
life in a World to Come, then there is hope that the righteous 
will share in a divine life." I 
Adams upholds a strong conception of God's love and intimate concern 
with creation in keeping with Cohn-Sherbock's thesis. 
A further point worth noting in reply to Wiles is that it is not clear 
whether Wiles' own deistic defense avoids the problem of unfairness. If 
miracles are only permissible if evenly distributed, does it follow that 
natural benefits should only be bestowed by God's all embracing cre-
ative action if evenly distributed? 
In "Divine Action: Shadow or Substance" William Alston provides a 
brilliant defense of an agentive view of God, over against a series of 
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philosophical and theological objections. James Gustafson's reply is 
commendable for his raising a host of questions about the ethical and 
religious implications of how we conceive of God's agency, though 
some of his reservations about Alston's paper are difficult to make out. 
Alston claims that "divine action is at the heart of the Christian tradi-
tion .... The Christian God is, preeminently, a God Who Acts" (p. 41). 
Gustafson does not seem to deny Biblical and traditional witness to a 
God who acts. Instead, his worry is whether "the focus on the God Who 
Acts excessively subordinates other strands of theology found in the 
Bible" (p. 66). On this front, he highlights Biblical references to God's 
power and glory as "seen through the beauties and terrors of nature," 
and concludes that "it is at least arguable" that in such accounts "God is 
interpreted power and order, related to the world less as actor than as 
impersonal reality to be confronted and praised" (pp. 64, 65). I do not 
see why Alston should be read as denying Biblical testimony of God 
being perceived through nature nor denying that God's reality vastly 
extends beyond the realm of persons, if by that we mean something 
peculiarly human. I believe Alston correctly sees our human life and the 
language of intentionality and agency as a key to understanding theistic 
language, but it is important to appreciate that he goes to great lengths 
to secure his position against a facile charge of anthropomorphism. 
To an extent, Gustafson's chief complaint seems to be that he wants 
more from Alston. In reply to Alston's appeal to Christian experience, 
Gustafson writes: 
One wonders if Alston would include in his view what many 
contemporary theologians claim to be the experience of God as 
liberator from social, economic, and political oppression 
through the conflicts in many arenas of life. The experience of 
God as Redeemer is found in historical processes of social con-
flict and social change for many liberation theologians: Latin 
Americas, Africans and Asians, feminists, and others" (p. 68). 
Alston's paper is a defense of the intelligibility of believing God acts in 
the world against a series of important objections, objections which do 
not so much as "excessively subordinate" the idea that God acts as deny 
it altogether. For a fuller account of the specific ways in which God acts 
in the world, a different, obviously far more extensive project is 
required. As for Gustafson's query just cited about Alston's view of lib-
eration theology, insofar as Alston's main thesis is plausible, then Alston 
has succeeded in defending the coherence of the belief that God acts in 
specific ways to liberate the oppressed. Where Gustafson tries to fill in 
what Alston's view might involve, or at least encourage, the ground is 
not very firm. "The position proposed by Alston is similar to various 
forms of Christian piety that are deeply individualistic, anthropocentric, 
and utilitarian." (p. 69). Alston's stance is no less similar to views and 
religious practices that are categorically opposed to individualism, 
anthropocentrism, and utilitarian (p. 69). The two final papers, 
"Divine Action, Created Causes, and Human Freedom" by Thomas 
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Tracy, and "Human Freedom, Human Sin, and God the Creator" by 
Kathryn Tanner, with replies by David Burrell and William Hasker, 
respectively, address the problem of sustaining a credible account of free 
will in a theistic cosmos. Can one preserve incompatibilist libertarian-
ism and belief that God directly or indirectly causes all our actions? 
Tracy concludes that "if our acts are directly enacted by God, then there 
is an important sense in which they are not free, and if they are free in 
this strong sense, then they cannot be direct acts of God" (p. 97). Hasker 
agrees. Tanner seeks to preserve the freedom of creatures and the 
absolute dependence of creation on God by carefully distinguishing lev-
els or dimensions of causality. Burrell does as well, though Hasker 
thinks these moves are unsuccessful. 
Hasker's stance is firmly in tune with the new "Openness of God" 
movement, a movement which, if Hasker is right, Tanner herself might 
have joined. In an effort to reconcile her strong conception of Divine 
sovereignty with recognizing sin as authored by human creatures, 
Tanner casts sin as a privation or defect, a failure in terms of action and 
attention, rather than a positive activity. In reply Hasker construes this 
inactivity or inattention as causal human contributions to creation and 
he is therefore "happy ... to welcome her into the fold" (p. 146). 
Whether part of the "Openness of God" fold or not, the Tanner and 
Burrell entries force one to struggle with an important paradox at the 
heart of monotheistic tradition. Tracy offers some helpful suggestions at 
the end of his paper as to how limited double agency might occur. This 
falls short of solving the paradox of double agency in Tanner's work, but 
it makes some headway in elucidating how "God continuously brings to 
bear the pressure of the divine purpose for us without simply displacing 
our purposes for ourselves" (p. 102). 
NOTES 
1. "Jewish Faith and the Holocaust," Religious Studies, vol. 26, pp. 292, 
293. I argue for a similar position in "Why We Need Immortality," Modern 
Theology 6:4, 1990, pp. 367-379. 
